Thailand, Pacific War and Indo-China

Thailand, Pacific War and Indo-China

Thai Polices on Bicycles

 In the period between the cessation of the Franco-Thai conflict and the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, Indo-China had changed in Thai perception from being a zone of opportunity to one of menace because of Japan’s forward movement from July 1941. Thai foreign policy towards French Indo-China was then influenced much more by the role of Japan than by that of France. In other words, Japan had come to replace France as Thailand’s potential adversary in the Peninsular. France, who had expressed willingness to co-operate with Japan in the Peninsula, no loner constituted a significant factor in Thai calculation.

As the Thais shared a strategic perspective with Britain, they maintained that they would certainly fight  to preserve their neutrality if they had the means of doing so, but that without such means they would be obliged to yield to force majeure. It was apparent that whether or not Thailand oppose the Japanese depended in the main on whether Britain and United would come to the rescue of Thailand and supply it with war materials.

But when the Thai Government approached the United States and Great Britain for assistance, nothing concrete was promised. Although Great Britain offered limited military co-operation in the Kra Isthmus in the event of a Japanese incursion into Thailand it could not alone give any guarantee to protect Thailand as a whole, since it did not possess the necessary forces.

In the early days of December 1941, Great Britain was engaged in consultations with the United States as to the possibility of a joint public warning by both governments that if Japan went to war with Thailand it would find itself at war with both the United States and Great Britain as well. On December 6 and December 7 respectively personal message to this general effect were sent by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Thai Premier. These message did not arrive in time.

The Thai Premier had no way of knowing in advance of these message which would have constituted what he might have deemed appropriate support for the successful continuation of a policy of neutrality. He thought that Thailand had been isolated by the two great Powers. He also realized that in the absence of any real prospect  of adequate military assistance, Thai resistance could not be counted upon.

He was therefore disposed to give up his determination to defend Thailand’s neutral position and reverted to being dependent upon a single dominant Power—Japan.