Indo-China : The First External Target of Thai Nationalism

Indo-China : The First External Target of Thai Nationalism

With the perceived presence of Japan as a countervailing power, strengthened by the rise of Nationalism, Irredentism and Pan-Thai feeling, and a build-up of Military Force, Phibunsonggram began to commit himself to an anti-French policy even before he became Prime Minister. From November 5, 1936, when the Thai government had abrogated the Treaty of February 14,1935, which governed the relations between France and Thailand, tension rose along Thailand-French Indo-China borders. The rumor spread that the Thai would use armed force to regain their ceded territories in French Indo-China. This rumor coincided with the expression of Thai leanings towards Japan, Italy and Germany. In April 1937, Phibunsonggram, then Minister of Defense, made a statement, which was broadcast throughout the country, indicating that he was very impressed with the success achieved by military means of Germany and Italy in Europe and Japan in Asia. Italy’s policy of expansion in Africa was admired, when he said:

Italy had recourse to arms to conquer territories (Abyssinia) for the benefit of her population, which lacked colonies. It was military power which made the operation possible. No other method was capable of producing such a success and giving victory.

In the same statement Phibunsonggram made it clear that Thailand had to arm itself and would wait until time provided it with fangs and claws before undertaking any such enterprise. From then onwards Thailand was evidently preparing for war with France by stationing troops and reinforcing its armaments along its side of the Mekong River. As a measure of warlike preparation, Phibunsonggram sent army officers to survey and prepare for the construction of airstrips in the border provinces with French Indo-China.

In order to prepare the people for war, moreover, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education and the Department of Publicity were instructed to co-operate with one another to inform the people of what was going on along the border. From July 1938 onwards, the Department of Publicity in particular was assigned to organize public debates and to produce posters or motion pictures showing the strength of the army, the navy and the air forces, purporting to ensure the confidence of the people in the capability of the government. To supplement this instruction, the so-called “Committee Dealing with the Problem of How to Raise the Morale of the Northeastern People” was formed. Membership included officials from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Publicity and the Ministry of Interior. The Committee was formed on the advice of Phibunsonggram. The latter, in consultation with the Minister of Interior, Lieutenant Commander Thamrong Navasavat, expressed his concern about the sense of panic and anxiety of Thai people along the border, who were preparing to evacuate for fear of war. He stated that this prospect would bring great difficulty to the government in the event of war with France, for the government would not then be able to rely on the support of civilians and reserve forces in the area. He further stated that in contrast to the Thai people, the people on the east bank of the Mekong had been aroused by the French authorities against the Thais, who cultivated the feeling that, under French protection, they were much happier and more prosperous than when under Thai rule. The intension was to make the Vietnamese and the Lao loyal to the French. Phibunsonggram pointed out the Vietnamese and the Lao would communicate with the Thai people on the west bank of the Mekong which might result in their being persuaded to give their loyalty to the French.

From the outset, Phibunsonggram’s irredentist policy had no prospect of achieving its objective because it was hindered by the French military and political manoeuvres. The French for their part were faced with pressure not only from the Thais but also from Japanese who had expanded their military activities in China close to the border with northern Vietnam. The French were more concerned about other rumors which were in circulation that Japan and Thailand had visions of dividing Eastern and Sothern Asia between themselves, and that Thailand would allow the passage of Japanese troops for an attack on French Indo-China. In response, the French authorities in Indo-China, urged Paris to increase the number of military aircraft in Indo-China to 400. The French government sought to find an immediate answer to the question of “ the Security of Indo-China and Siamese Imperialism”, and decided at once to increase military, naval and air forces in Indo-China, and concentrate sufficient strength, not at Luang Prabang or Pakse in Laos but at Battambang or Monkolborey in Cambodia within an hour’s flight from Thai capital. In July 1938, the French ordered the mobilization of 20,000 indigenous troops and stationed Senegalese military units along the border with Thailand. The French, therefore, began to be concerned about the 1,800 miles of common undefended frontier. They began to strengthen their defenses, while rumors spread about the construction of a Maginot Line along the Mekong River to meet the Thai menace.

In a political manoeuvre, the French kindled the fire of patriotism within the breasts of the indigenous people in Laos and Cambodia to foster hostility towards the Thais. The Cambodians, in particular, were reminded of their past glorious kingdom being destroyed by the Thai army and of their former territories being wrested from them by the Thais. The French went so far as to advise the Cambodians to stop dressing in a similar manner to the Thais. In fact, nationalism, kindled by the French, took root in the minds of the Cambodian people. For example, a Cambodian author, whose pen-name was Khemara Butr(a son of Cambodia), wrote an article in Cambodian weekly magazine, known as “Angkor Wat”, vigorously attacking Thailand’s policy of regaining territory in Laos and Cambodia. He described Thailand as “ a country with excessive ambitions, without knowing its place.”

Phibunsonggram’s irredentist policy was hindered not only by the French military and political manoeuvres but also by the liberal leader Pridi Banomyong, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. In a memorandum submitted to the meeting of the “Committee Dealing with the Problem of How to Raise the Morale of the Northeastern People”, Pridi expressed his opposition to the ambitious policy of the military party. He attributed increasing tension along the border with French Indo-China to the abusive words of those who were arousing the people to the hatred of Great Britain and France and who supported a military policy to regain the lost territories. Pridi was of the opinion that the time was not yet ripe for the Thais to pursue such an ambitious policy as both Britain and France were still militarily strong. He warned his colleagues in the Cabinet of the dander of such a policy.

Pridi always expressed a cautious stance towards the French. Foe example, in August 1938, an official statement was drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 80,000 copies of which were distributed to the people. The gist of this statement was to warn the people not to panic at the rumor of the inevitability of war between Thailand and France.

In the wake of disunity and lack of consensus among the members of the Thai Cabinet over this irredentist policy, publicly efforts were made both by French and Thais to keep relations smooth. The Government of Indo-China for its part curbed the anti-Thai bias of its local press but in both countries there was an unpleasant undercurrent of suspicion.

Such a softened attitude held by Pridi harmed his political position at the time when he was competing with Phibunsonggram for succession to Phya Phahol as Prime Minister. As irredentism was shared mainly among young officers in the Navy and the Army, they began to consider Pridi to be less than patriotic and too weak to be Prime Minister. Instead, Phibunsonggram, whose determination to carry on an irredentist policy was acknowledged, obtained the support of the Army and the Navy to succeed Phya Phahol in December 1938. Thus Phibunsonggram took advantage of the frequent alarms along the borders to strengthen his influence in Thai domestic politics.

In point of fact, Thailand alone could not pose a danger to France (and Great Britain). But on the day that she began to cooperate with Japan, Tokyo would be able to exploit this new dimension of Thai nationalism-irredentism and Greater Thai movement—to Anglo-French disadvantage. Both France and Great Britain subscribed to this assessment and both powers grew increasingly alarmed as the Japan-Thailand association became more intense and aggressive.